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Documentation Index

Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.blindference.xyz/llms.txt

Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

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Attestation Guide

Attestation provides cryptographic proof that a node is running the expected inference engine and hasn’t been tampered with. The ICL verifies this proof before the node is eligible for job assignments.

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Why Attestation Matters

Without attestation, any node could claim to be running the correct software while actually running tampered models that produce wrong (or malicious) outputs. Attestation closes this trust gap.

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Attestation Backends

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Mock Attestation (Current — Tier 0)

Key: weloveblindference (default HMAC-SHA256 key, override via MOCK_ATTESTATION_KEY env var) How it works:
  1. The ICL issues a random challenge nonce
  2. The node computes HMAC-SHA256(key="weloveblindference", msg=challenge)
  3. The ICL verifies the HMAC with the same key
Trust guarantee: None. This is purely for pipeline validation and developer testing. Nodes using mock attestation are tier 0 but are still eligible for all jobs (leader and verifier) because all current models are tier 0. Use case: Development, testing, initial integration Commands: 
# With --mock flag (skips interactive selection)
blindference-node attest --mock

# With custom dev key
blindference-node attest --mock --tee-key mydevkey
The --mock flag is required. The CLI checks MOCK_ATTESTATION_KEY env var first, then falls back to weloveblindference. The --tee-key flag overrides the key for development TEE simulation.

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TPM 2.0 (Next Phase — Tier 1)

How it will work:
  1. The ICL issues a challenge nonce
  2. The node uses tpm2-tools to create a TPM quote binding the challenge to PCR values
  3. The inference engine hash is loaded into PCR 15 at startup
  4. The ICL verifies the quote against the node’s endorsement key
Trust guarantee: OS-level integrity. Proves the node runs the expected software stack. Hardware required: TPM 2.0 chip (standard on most machines since 2016) Use case: Production nodes needing hardware-backed trust

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AMD SEV-SNP / Intel TDX (Future — Tier 2)

How it will work:
  1. The node daemon runs inside an SNP-protected process or TDX trust domain
  2. The AES prompt key is only materialized within the enclave’s encrypted memory
  3. Manufacturer-signed attestation quote generated
  4. The ICL verifies against AMD/Intel certificate chain
Trust guarantee: Hardware-enforced memory encryption. Even the machine owner cannot read process memory. Hardware required: AMD EPYC with SEV-SNP or Intel Xeon with TDX Use case: Maximum security for sensitive inference workloads

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Attestation Flow

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Auto-Re-Attestation

Nodes now self-heal without manual intervention:
  • Startup check: On blindference-node run, the daemon checks if the certificate is missing or expired
  • Auto-re-attest: Automatically generates a new quote, submits to ICL, persists the new certificate
  • Watchdog: Background task checks every 10 minutes. If certificate expires within 6 hours, triggers re-attestation proactively
This eliminates the operational burden of manually re-attesting nodes after ICL restarts or certificate expiry.

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Manual Re-Attestation

While auto-re-attest handles all cases, you can manually trigger it: 
# Mock attestation (development)
blindference-node attest --mock

# With custom mock key
MOCK_ATTESTATION_KEY=mydevkey blindference-node attest --mock

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Interactive Attestation Flow (without —mock)

If you run blindference-node attest without --mock, the CLI presents an interactive menu: 
Attestation type:
  [1] Mock (development)
  [2] TEE / TPM (production)
Select [1]:
  • Option 1 (Mock): Proceeds with mock attestation using weloveblindference
  • Option 2 (TEE): Explains hardware requirements, then offers “Use development TEE simulation?” — if yes, prompts for an attestation key (default weloveblindference) and proceeds as a development attestation
After ICL attestation succeeds, the CLI will ask: 
Do you want to register on-chain? [Y/n]:
  → If YES: estimates gas, shows cost, sends NodeRegistry.register() tx
  → If NO:  continues with ICL-only mock attestation (no stake required)
The on-chain registration is optional for mock/development tiers. Production tiers (TPM/TEE) require on-chain registration.

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Certificate Lifecycle

EventActionFrequency
Initial startupAuto-attestOnce
Expiry < 6hWatchdog re-attestEvery 10min check
Expiry detectedImmediate re-attestOn startup/run
ICL restartNode auto-re-attestsNext heartbeat cycle

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Tier Capabilities

CapabilityTier 0Tier 1Tier 2
Verifier jobs✅✅✅
Leader jobs✅✅✅
High-value tasks✅✅✅
Premium fee rate❌✅✅
Note: All current built-in models (facebook/opt-125m, groq:llama-3.3-70b-versatile, gemini:gemini-2.5-flash) are tier 0, so tier 0 nodes participate in all quorums. Future models may require higher tiers.

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Troubleshooting

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”Attestation certificate expired”

The daemon will auto-re-attest. If it fails:
  1. Check ICL connectivity: curl $BLF_ICL_ENDPOINT/health
  2. Check network access to ICL
  3. Restart the daemon: blindference-node run

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”Attestation rejected by ICL”

  • For mock backend: Ensure you’re using the correct hardcoded key
  • For TPM: Check tpm2-tools installation and TPM chip availability
  • For TEE: Verify enclave is properly initialized

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”Certificate expiry in the past”

System clock may be wrong. Verify: 
date  # Should show current UTC time